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Implicit psychological theories in 
legal thought on sentencing and 
liability by Wilfried Hommers 
The moral rule to undo harm done complements the moral rule not to do 
harm. In modern criminal and civil law, the legal concepts of 'sentencing' and 
'liability' represent the moral rule of undoing harm. Both concepts are em-
bedded in a variety of codified rules, and an extensive legal literature discusses 
the rules and related problems and issues. 
The legal form of the moral rule to undo harm changed over time. Many of 
the terms which today denote the various aspects of undoing harm in law and 
in everyday life - like restitution, compensation and reparation - all have 
their origins in Roman law and some have parallel concepts in Germanic law 
(Schoch, 1987; Tunc, 1983). Also, the legal rules on undoing harm vary across 
cultures (Honore, 1983; Stoll, 1986). Therefore, the question arises whether 
or not, and, if so, which psychological causes are related to these sets of rules 
and legal thought and their variations. 
This chapterl goes beyond the unspecified direction of this question. Since 
modern criminal and civil laws are the products of legal thought, which has 
been in the process of development for several thousand years, it is assumed 
that looking at this development as it is documented (in the history of law 
and in comparative law) and analyzing its products in the codified law, may 
be informative for the psychological theory of undoing harm. 
The general approach of the present paper rests on two never-debated as-
sumptions: (1) legal thought had its beginning in the moral intuitions of ev-
eryday life more than 4000 years ago and (2) through 3500 years of written 
law, legal thought developed into an expert system, not only on theoretical 
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grounds (abolition of inconsistencies when detected) or on prescriptive grounds 
(changed purposes oflaw makers) but also due to law makers' consideration of 
various kinds of experience. Thus, the legal rules which were developed may 
have multiple facets which result in different interpretations when discussed 
from the various perspectives of law-analyzing scientists. One overlooked con-
sequence, however, may be that legal notions and implicit theories incorporate 
statements which are near to or equivalent to scientific truth. Therefore, the 
analysis of the explicit legal rules and the implicit legal theories of 'sentencing' 
and 'liability' may have heuristic value for the cognitive science of the everyday 
morality of today, such that descriptive and prescriptive moral thought could 
interact in a new way. 
Legal rules are certainly made by experts for application by experts. Addi-
tionally, they are prescriptive. Accordingly, there are two principal outcomes of 
research guided by implicit legal theories: congruence and difference. The first 
possible outcome is that the congruence of implicit legal theories and cogni-
tive science of everyday morality will be discovered. In that case, a remarkable 
consequence would arise from decisions by judges which conform to normative 
rules which have a structure similar to empirical theories found among laymen. 
The prescriptive rules may be viewed as introspective descriptions of intuitive 
cognitive processes, since judges are expected to follow rules only as long as 
this is feasible. Therefore, in the case of congruence, the assumed influence 
of normative theories on judges demonstrates that prescriptive thought is not 
needed to implement judgement processes structurally different and assumed 
to be better than those of laymen, but to avoid insufficient application of the 
available rules in order to avoid errors. Thus, congruence of prescriptive and 
descriptive approaches may have practical implications as well as heuristic 
implications. 
With regard to the second principle - outcome - one may wonder whether 
there might be any consistency between everyday morality and an expert sys-
tem at all. Differences, rather than similarities, between them are more likely 
to exist in valuation and in cognitive processes. However) no attempt will be 
made to verify that prescriptive rules are descriptively valid or to evaluate 
empirical results against prescriptive statements, as has frequently been done 
in decision research, e.g. on conservatism (Edwards, 1968, which was critically 
discussed by Cohen, 1981) or in equity research (Mellers, 1982). Instead, rather 
general features of implicit legal theories are sought to give some new impetus 
to psychological research on moral thought. The expected impetus rests on the 
analogies found between descriptive and prescriptive theories of information 
integration. Therefore, this chapter will begin with a general overview of those 
analogies. 
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The legal literature suggests that a primary characteristic of legal thought on 
sentencing is its focus on valuation and integration of evidence. Even simple 
cases typically involve multiple pieces of information, each of which has to be 
evaluated for its implications with respect to the judgment to be made, and all 
of which have to be integrated to arrive at a final judgment. This is true for the 
task of sentence choice among a variety of qualitative sanction alternatives, as 
is inherent in the German criminal law for juveniles and in some Anglo-Saxon 
law (Pennington and Lloyd-Bostock, 1987). It is also true for fixing recovery 
proportions in cases of civil liability among several parties and for the fixing 
of the sentence quantum for adults. 
Cognitive science developed a descriptive theory of information integra-
tion (see Anderson, 1981, 1982, for a complete presentation of the cognitive 
approach of the information integration theory). Although this approach is 
not restricted to morality, it is remarkable how similar basic concepts look in 
both the descriptive and the prescriptive approach. This section will attempt 
to give an impression of these similarities and will discuss them in terms of 
parallels and contrasts between the cognitive approach to everyday morality 
and the legal normative approach to applied morality. 
Parallels and contrasts are clearly visible in two fundamental composi-
tion schemes: for sentencing in the prescriptive approach and for blame in 
the descriptive approach. The sentencing scheme mentioned by Maurach et 
al. (1984) states that fixing the amount of punishment in criminal cases is a 
joint function of the two components 'act' (Handlung) and 'effect' (Er/olg). 
The 'blame' scheme of Anderson (1983) states that everyday moral judgement 
is a joint function of 'responsibility' and 'consequences'. Both schemes are 
similar, because the 'act' component is conceptually congruent with the re-
sponsibility component. Both schemes differ in an important aspect, however. 
That of Maurach et al. (1984) categorizes the list of sentencing factors given 
in sentencing Article 46 of the German criminal code. These factors are di-
vided into two classes which ought to interact by law if present in a criminal 
case. No precise statement is made on how that interaction must occur. Only 
the connecting word 'and' is used to denote the function of the composition. 
The descriptive blame scheme states similarly that both components influence 
moral judgements, but the specific interest lies in discovering how this joint 
influence operates in everyday morality. 
Thus, there are differences in the direction of inquiry. The normative theo-
ries provide prescriptions for enhancing justice in reality, while the descriptive 
approach strives, inductively and deductively, to develop theory based on all 
forms of observable moral judgements, that is on everyday morality as well as 
on legal practice representing expert morality. Of course, one would expect 
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experts' judgements to differ from those of laymen, since the former might 
have been influenced by legal rules whereas the latter are not assumed to. 
But this contrast in the direction of inquiry is clear, even if a certain rule is 
descriptive for both judgements. This combination of parallel and contrast un-
derlies the following discussion of the basic concepts of the descriptive theory 
of information integration and the related notions of legal thought. 
Knowledge systems 
Both integrational approaches operate on a knowledge system. A knowledge 
system typically contains both declarative knowledge about stimuli and goals, 
and procedural knowledge for utilizing that declarative knowledge. The typ-
ical contribution of the descriptive information integration approach is made 
by combining research on procedural aspects of the knowledge system with 
research on declarative aspects of the knowledge system. Within the descrip-
tive information integration approach, the procedural aspect of the knowledge 
system may vary from person to person, although they are considered to be 
substantially invariable, at least over some time period, for each person. This 
rule of invariability provides a theoretical foundation for value analysis by 
means of functional measurement methodology. 
In contrast, processes should obey generally shared rules in the normative 
legal context, as is clear if one looks at the law of civil and criminal proce-
dure. As the following analysis of the implicit theories of sentencing show, 
the normative rule generally also seems to be true for the normative rules on 
sentencing in German law. Some cases, however, may be very complicated, 
that even experts will use a simplified scheme in lieu of the prescriptive scheme 
of integration of evidence. 
Finally, the essential difference between legal thought and the cognitive 
science of everyday morality lies in declarative knowledge. Judges, 'as well as 
lawyers and prosecutors, are well trained in the use of codified penal and civil 
rules and in civil and criminal legal procedure, but even laymen may accept 
these rules if they are properly explained. Therefore, legal thought is usually 
not, and should not be, the arbitrary declarative knowledge of a professional 
minority. Instead, it should coincide with everyday morality to a sufficient 
extent. The effective difference lies in the ease of retrieval and the reliability 
and controllability of its products. 
Valuation 
Parallels and contrasts also appear in the concept of value. The parallel is 
found in the transformation of objectively given information (the proven facts 
of the case) into subjective values which are not directly observable, but which 
are relevant to the judgement. The contrast is that the approach of information 
integration places the measurement of the intermediate values on a firm foun-
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dation, whereas the normative rules of legal thought are not concerned with 
these intermediate values per se. Nevertheless, these values may become more 
interesting for legal thought when it becomes known that there is a method 
for their measurement. 
Additionally, there is a similarity in the personal character of valuation 
and in its contextual determination. In a normative legal context, valuation 
may be acceptable as being in principle personal, although much valuation is 
constrained by codified sentencing frames or by sentencing guidelines. Never-
theless, the concept of judge's discretion shows that there is room for personal 
valuation which is not regarded as error or personal deviation. This may ad-
ditionally be seen in divided court decisions, which presumably result because 
different judges give different values and weights to the same evidence. 
Integration 
The primary focus of both normative and descriptive theories is on processes 
of information integration, as befits a world with multiple causes and deter-
minants. The basic, and empirically well-supported, claim of information in-
tegration theory is the existence of a general cognitive algebra operative in 
integration processes. This claim parallels legal theories on sentencing and li-
ability which, according to observations presented below, contain rudimentary 
features of complete cognitive algebraic rules. Although judicial theories ought 
better to serve the function of reaching the goal of justice, those rules may be 
interpreted as demonstrations of an operative normative legal algebra, an idea 
comparable to the hedonistic calculus of J. Bentham (1748-1833) and J.S. Mill 
(1806-1873).2 
Weighing as functional perspective 
Prescriptive legal thought and descriptive cognitive science share the notion 
of weighing. In particular, the notion of weighing is ample evidence of such 
analogies, since weighing is the common essential for the shared focus on 'goal-
directed' behaviour. The cognitive science of morality is concerned with goal-
directed behaviour, since everyday morality influences political, educational 
and other behaviour of individuals. Likewise, normative theories of jurispru-
dence are concerned with influencing behaviour. A focus on the goal-directed 
quality of both everyday morality and normative morality leads to a functional 
perspective: processing of information is heavily dependent on its function in 
goal attainment. It follows that moral judgement, as well as sentencing is 
contextual and constructive: contextual, since its determinants are the rele-
vant stimulus information and the goals; constructive, since the variation of 
stimulus effects are determined by their weighing in dependence of the goals. 
2Jeremy Bentham: Introduction to the principles of morals and legislation and John 
Stuart Mill: Utilitarianism. 
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A remarkable property of the descriptive information integration approach 
is that it can estimate the weights of qualitatively different attributes on a 
common ratio scale. Comparison of the importance of information for various 
goals is not confounded by scale values and thus becomes possible. This can be 
achieved by putting restraint on the weights. Restraint is not used in the or-
dinary concept of weighing, either by laymen or in statistics (regression). But 
restraint on weights may be a consequence of the legal concept of weighing, 
where weighing has to occur within the sentencing frame and other aspects of 
legal sentencing prescriptions, for instance in the notion of the average case. 
Thus, the information integration approach may be useful for the meaning-
ful comparison of weights operative in sentencing judgments of persons with 
different punishment goals. Also, the averaging model may be operative in 
normative and actual legal algebra, as this chapter intends to show. 
Validity tests for rules 
Descriptive information integration theory distinguishes several rules. Each 
hypothetical rule has typical features which provide a validation criterion for 
the other rules. Legal thought, however, has excluded such empirical tests 
for the validity of the integration processes, although normative legal theories 
on sentencing strive to reduce disparity. At present, a written justification of 
sentence has to be given to allow for appeal. But, Bauer (1984) and Hassemer 
(1983) showed that the written justifications of sentences were not related to 
the sentence severity. Thus, there is no valid information available on the 
process of sentencing, although, of course, gross errors in either justification 
or sentencing can be corrected in appeal. In particular, there is no valid 
information on how sentence quantum should be fixed. That would allow for a 
direct test of normative legal algebra in judicial settings. Empirical cognitive 
science may provide a remedy. 
In descriptive information integration theory, the most frequently validated 
rule is the averaging rule: Rijk = wa.Ai + Wb.Bj + wc·Ck, with Wa + Wb + Wc = l. 
This rule is predominant in the descriptions of judgements on social informa-
tion. The characteristic test of the averaging rule is provided by the com-
parison of sets of information of varying complexity (partial versus complete). 
For example, the effect of varying the information Ai in judgements on the 
combined information (AiBj) should be larger than the effect of varying A in 
judgements on the more complex information (AiBjCk), where the terms in 
brackets denote factorial combinations. 
Other rules, like the fractionalizing rule, Rij = Ad Bj , would not show 
this effect. Instead, the fractionalizing rule would graphically plot as curves 
with a common intersection, which is not predicted by the averaging rule (see 
Anderson, 1981, 1982, for more detail on the issue of rule assessment). If it can 
be shown that the implicit legal theories contain valid process assumptions, 
these tests of integration rules might become a remedy for the uncontrolled 
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state of the sentencing process. Thus, the gap between the prescriptive and 
the descriptive information integration theories could be bridged. 
Legal features of sentencing and liability 
Within the general similarities of prescriptive and descriptive theories of evi-
dence or of information integration there are several specific features of legal 
thought which lead to hypotheses. The following discussion, therefore, demon-
strates the heuristic value of legal morality. 
Undoing harm as stimulus and response 
One strategy to undo harm is to let the harm-doer pay his debt to the victim. 
This can be done in several ways, for instance by apology (which may not be 
sufficient but is better than nothing), by giving some material award (which 
may serve several purposes and may be valued according to the wealth of the 
harm-doer) or by repairing the damage in kind (which may sometimes be not 
feasible). For the present purposes the term 'recompense' is used to denote all 
these possibilities. 
Two different functional aspects of recompense are contained in the civil 
and criminal laws of modern countries. Assignment of liability is the major 
legal consequence in civil law, both for contracts and under tort. This serves 
both punitive and restitutive purposes. In the notion of liability, recompense 
is functional as response; in most cases as a coerced response, an obligation. 
Specifically, in German law liability serves two functions: restitution and smart 
money. Both have a different purpose: indemnifying (restitution) versus sat-
isfying (smart money) the injured party. Restitution is ordinarily meant to be 
restitutio in integrum in German law. Thus, indemnification will be in kind, if 
possible, but, if restitution in kind (natural restitutio in integrum) is not pos-
sible, recompense in the form of a monetary award to the victim (the extent 
of which is strictly related to the damage in order to avoid enrichment) is a 
solution to the problem. 
In criminal law recompense is a factor which determines, among other 
things, the quantum of the sentence. Thus, recompense is functional as stimu-
lus. In criminal law, even incomplete components of recompense like apology, 
attempts to repair or some form of active remorse are relevant for sentencing. 
Other aspects, such as the extent to which recompense is voluntary, or the 
extent of self-involvement, are relevant as well. Furthermore, reparation of the 
harm by the harm-doer may prevent the prosecution from pursuing the case. 
Thus, recompense as stimulus appears under the broader notion of recompense 
and has several effects, e.g. mitigation, diversion and mediation. 
In contrast with the civil law, undoing harm is functional as a stimulus 
and as a response in criminal law, since for crimes which are severe enough, 
some form of recompense can still appear to be connected with punishment. 
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Moreover, in criminal law some aspects embodied in the civil law notion of lia-
bility to the victim appear in connection with punishing the harm-doer. Thus, 
these aspects can be manipulated independently from punishing, whereas in 
civil law the punitive aspect of liability to the victim is confounded with the 
restitutive aspect. As a consequence, psychological research using recompense 
as a stimulus and examining its influence on punishment may be the best way 
to understand the psychology of sentencing and liability. 
Non-additive nature of mitigation-aggravation information 
In the normative theories of legal thought, the integration of mitigation-aggra-
vation information in sentencing appears to have the structure of non-additive 
composition rules. This is demonstrated by the sentencing theory of the Ger-
man legal scholar Von Linstow (1974). He proposed various formulae, from 
a total of 45 variables, for calculating the punishments for all possible cases 
of traffic violations. Recompense, as one representative variable of mitiga-
tion, was incorporated as a multiplicative factor with values between .8 and 
1.0. Thus, the non-additive rule was stated in a similar way to the following 
abbreviated form: 
Deserved punishment = (Culpa + Damage) * Recompense 
In this formula, values of recompense less that 1 would reduce the deserved 
punishment. However, this reductive effect of values lower than 1 would be 
greater for high amounts of damage or for severe culpa levels. Thus, although 
the subjective values of recompense might be constant, their effect is not. 
Other multiplicative mitigation factors were the degree to which the victim 
was at fault (.1 to 1 in range) and the damage suffered by the harmdoer (.5 to 1 
in range). Similar multiplicative influences were proposed for the aggravating 
factor of blood alcohol level (1. 3 to 1. 65 in range), the degree of the purposeful 
disregard of driving incapability (2.05 to 3.0 in range), and for some form of 
aggravating behaviour after the traffic violation (1.0 to 1.275 in range). 
It is remarkable is that some factors are in part additively and in part non-
additively related to other factors. For example, the criminal history of the 
offender was incorporated as a factor with a varying relation to other informa-
tion. For some factors, like post-occurrence behaviour or amount of damage, 
the normative composition rules for the various offences were additive, for 
others, like harm-doer's self-damage, the composition rules state a multiplica-
tive relation. Thus, the specified formulae of Von Linstow (1974) provide a 
complex structure of normative composition rules. This complexity has two 
sources: the amount of relevant information and the type of the composition 
operation. 
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Multiplex-response 
Some types of harm are followed, not only in German law of course, by two 
legal reactions directed towards undoing that harm: one more or less punitive, 
the other more or less restitutive. This happens with those harms listed in 
the criminal code, and with those malicious or bodily injury torts for which 
punitive damages (Prosser, 1971) or smart money might be applicable. This 
dual nature of this reaction is a solution which brings justice to both the 
victim and the harm-doer. A characteristic of the two responses is that they 
combine in some form into a loss to the harm-doer. This might be necessary 
for the purpose of deterrence or, alternatively, it may be experienced only by 
the harm-doer as a summed suffering. 
This dual nature of the legal reactions in some cases is fundamentally dif-
ferent from the multivariate responses frequently used in research on social 
cognition (Darby and Schlenker, 1982; Miller and McCann, 1979). Multi-
variate responses do not add up. On the contrary they may possibly be re-
dundant. To note this difference from multivariate responses, the notion of 
multiplex-response is used. As a minimum requirement for the application of 
the multiplex-response, both liability and pure punishment may be used as a 
duplex-response. Thus, studying undoing harm empirically using a response 
approach may be promising when a duplex-response is employed, where the 
responses of punishment and of restitution are combined. An extreme case 
would be the application of a triplex-response - where punishment, restitu-
tion and smart money or punitive damages are used in combination - to study 
the cognitive structures of undoing harm. 
Information integration by weighing 
A fundamental legal concept developed for its information integration task is 
the concept of 'weighing'. However, there are two concepts of weighing, at 
least in German civil and German criminal law commentaries, although the 
processes are called the same for both: Abwagung, i.e. integration by weighing. 
The existence of two legal notions of 'integration by weighing' follows from 
several observations. 
First, there are different lists of factors which are relevant for the integra-
tion by weighing in legal liability judgments and in legal sentencing judgments. 
For liability judgments, the relative likelihoods for the causation of the damage 
have to be taken into account, primarily when there is a fault of the injured 
party involved or when there are several tort-feasors. Comparisons of culpa-
bility and the existence of strict liability are also relevant factors (Honsell, 
1977; Schlegelmilch, 1986). For sentencing, §46(2) of the German penal code 
(StGB 1975) provides a list of relevant factors, e.g. the motives and goals of 
the harm-doer or his behaviour after the act. 
Secondly, in commentaries on the German civil code, integration by weigh-
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ing for liability for immaterial losses, i.e. for smart money decisions, is ex-
plicitly described to be different from the procedures prescribed for material 
liability where restitutio in integrum holds as a basic principle (Rebmann and 
Sacker, 1979). Also, when smart money is awarded, it is added to the material 
restitution. Unfortunately, the commentaries do not say more precisely how 
weighing in smart money differs from integrating weighing in material liability. 
However, from the double function of smart money (restitutive indemnifica-
tion and punitive satisfaction) may follow that the integration by weighing 
prescribed for smart money decisions is similar to the prescribed sentencing 
process. Thus, there is ample evidence for the existence of two legal notions 
of integration by weighing, even in civil law. 
Thirdly, the two commentaries show that an implicit compound hypothesis 
can be derived on the structure of the impact of fault of the injured party on 
criminal sentencing decision and on civil liability decisions. The result is a 
differential effect hypothesis and a differential integration rule hypothesis, re-
spectively, operative on the duplex-response. Each of the relevant observations 
will be outlined in the three sections that follow. 
Fault of the injured party 
Fault of the injured party appears to be primarily a concept of private law, but 
this concept is also relevant to criminal law. Moreover, the related notion of 
contributory negligence is known since the Lex Aequilia in Roman law (Radin, 
1927: 144). There, and in common law, contributory negligence excludes 
liability. According to Deutsch (1987) the concept of weighing the fault of the 
actor and of the injured became dominant in the German laws of the 19th 
century. Today a social component is associated with the consideration of 
the fault of the injured party as, under strict liability, only gross fault of the 
injured will reduce the restitution to the injured (Deutsch, 1987). 
The fault of the injured party is present in different ways in the German 
codes on torts and on punishable acts. The concept of fault of the injured 
party appears explicitly in the German civil code. In §254 of the German civil 
code of 1900, the liability for the damages in those cases where a fault of the 
injured party exists is explicitly regulated. In the German criminal code of 
1975, the fault of the injured party is only indirectly present. It is subsumed 
under the broader notion of 'harmful consequences of the act for which the 
harm-doer is responsible' as a factor which reduces the measure of culpability. 
Thus, not only its presence in both parts of the delictual law, but also the 
different importance of the concept for both parts are noticeable aspects of 
the concept of fault of the injured party in the written German law. 
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Fractionalizing liability 
Normative theories on combining information in liability decisions have a spe-
cific form in German legal thought. In the case of a fault of the injured party, 
'integration by weighing' means that the loss has to be partitioned among the 
involved parties (Rebmann and Sacker, 1979; Schlegelmilch, 1986). However, 
the German term for partitioning does not necessarily mean distribution, but is 
also related to an algebraic division operation. Thus, the more general concept 
of 1055 distribution which may follow one or the other of various procedural 
rules found for gain distributions (Harris, 1976; Vecchio, 1984) is specified by 
an algebraic operation. 
The association between weighing in liability decisions and an algebraic 
division operation is affirmed by practice of the courts. The courts use frac-
tional numbers and they follow, in cases with several independent harm-doers 
and only one injured party, idiosyncratic rules which do not correspond to any 
simple rule of mathematical algebra. For example, in the case where B causes 
three-fifths of the damage to A, and C two-thirds, it turns out from making the 
nominators of the fractions equal that A gets seven ninths in total from Band 
C (Schlegelmilch, 1986: 53). Therefore, legal thinking in the civil law employs 
and prescribes at least quasi-algebraic fractionalizing rules for the integration 
by weighing connected with the injured party's fault. 
Frame-narrowing procedure in sentencing 
The leading normative sentencing theory of the German criminal commen-
taries (Bruns, 1974, 1980; Maurach, Gossel and Zipf, 1984; Zipf, 1977; Mon-
tenbruck, 1983; Jescheck, RuB and Willms, 1985; Rudolphi, Horn, Samson 
and Schreiber, 1985) prescribes a frame-narrowing procedure. The prescrip-
tive frame-narrowing procedure operates in three steps. In the first step, the 
subsumption of the defendant's act under a punishable act codified in the spe-
cific part of the penal code is a search for the proper frame. In the second step 
of the normative theory, the applicable sentencing frame, i.e. for which crime 
the defendant is to be punished, will be narrowed according to the informa-
tion of the sentencing factors given in principle by §46 of the German criminal 
code. Thus, the maximum variation is narrowed by added information. This 
frame-narrowing by adding information applies also to the third step of the 
normative sentencing theory of the German criminal code. In the third step, 
the so-called 'frame of culpability' (Schuldrahmen) is transformed into a final 
decision which states a precisely specified sentence length (of days in prison 
or of an income related fine) and which, if applicable, is paired with other 
sanctions, like withdrawal of driver's license. In this final step of the legal 
sentencing theory the preventive aspects relevant for the harm-doer have to be 
taken into account when the judge makes his sentence. 
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Consequences 
Summarizing the above, three major implicit hypotheses of legal thought have 
been outlined: averaging in punishment, fractionalizing and averaging on the 
duplex-response and, although with exceptions, non-additivity of mitigation 
as well as of aggravation information. These demand empirical investigations 
by both laymen and experts. 
Frame-narrowing and averaging 
The averaging model as a specific model of descriptive information integra-
tion theory (see above), is present as an implicit hypothesis for punishment 
judgments in the German legal commentaries on the concept of 'integration by 
weighing' in criminal sentencing. The characteristic prediction of the descrip-
tive averaging model of the information integration theory (Anderson, 1981, 
1982) is that the effect of the variation of one piece of information decreases 
when other information is combined with the original piece of information. 
The predictions of descriptive information integration theory are consistent 
with the prescriptive frame of narrowing procedure. The first step in pre-
scriptive narrowing procedure is comparable to the technical fine-tuning of the 
rating scale by using end-anchors in experiments of the descriptive information 
integration theory. The prescriptive frame-narrowing procedure, when adding 
other relevant information on the case, as happens in the second and the third 
step of this approach, is also operative in the effect of added information on 
the effect of the preliminary information set as predicted by empirical averag-
ing theory. Thus, there is a strong congruence between the frame-narrowing 
models and the predictions of the descriptive averaging model of information 
integration theory. 
However, one may note some differences between descriptive and prescrip-
tive frame-narrowing models. First, the averaging model may have other fea-
tures which are not present in the frame of culpability. For example, the 
frame of culpability contains a narrowing of previous boundaries, whereas the 
averaging model does not necessarily imply this 'narrowing within' feature. 
Secondly, the analogy in prescriptive frame-narrowing applies for two large 
steps, but within these steps the integration of several aspects mentioned in 
§46 must occur. It is not entirely clear from the legal texts how this is done. 
However, the legal literature speaks of weighing the various factors. Thus, 
it seems possible that averaging theory would hold also for these integration 
tasks, where it might operate according to the 'narrowing within' scheme of 
the normative frame of culpability theory or according to the less restricted 
averaging model. Thirdly, the final legal decision does not totally form an 
analogy to the averaging model. For example, no statement with regard to 
the choice of additional sanctions by the judge or by the judges can be derived 
from the averaging model. 
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Of course, culpability frame theory still allows for some inconsistencies of 
sentencing. At each step, personal variations may be introduced, which can 
lead to a considerable variation in the final sentence. However, variation in 
individual preliminary results may also be reduced in the final result, when the 
frame of culpability is applied, using some remedies proposed by Montenbruck 
(1983) and others. Thus, the topic of sentencing disparity may become less 
dramatic when prescriptive theory is intensely applied. This hypothesis may be 
tested even with laymen. However, sentencing disparity in length of sentence is 
still a matter of the descriptive power of the information integration analogy. 
One must interpret the variation in final sentence as a consequence of the 
judges personal variability, be it systematic or random. As a consequence, one 
would need more specific information on the judge's sentencing variables to 
reduce this variability. 
A veraging and fractionalizing of fault 
The second implicit hypothesis, shown above, was a compound hypothesis of 
averaging and fractionalizing for the integration of information on the fault 
of the two or more parties involved in a wrong. The compound character of 
this hypothesis is contained in the claim of a linked validity of averaging and 
fractionalizing when the duplex-response is employed. For the same stimulus 
information displayed in a duplex-response experiment, both averaging on the 
punishment response and fractionalizing on the restitution response should be 
supported by the structure of the judgements. Aside from the compound hy-
pothesis of averaging and fractionalizing, there is another implicit hypothesis 
stating a differential effect of the fault of the injured party on the two responses. 
On the restitution response, a larger effect of information on the fault of the in-
jured party is expected than on the punishment response. Since an experiment 
employing a duplex-response has never been carried out in moral judgement 
research, the innovative character of this implicit legal hypothesis is apparent. 
Non-additivity of mitigation and aggravation 
Two illustrative heuristic questions follow from the material on mitigation and 
aggravation integration detailed above. The first is on the empirical validity of 
the partly additive, but primarily non-additive influence of mitigation-aggra-
vation information on other information about the harmful act. The second 
heuristic question is how this mixed-format integration can be accounted for. 
In case of the validity of the averaging model for punishment judgments, one 
would have means to account for additivity as well as non-additivity by the 
assumption of differential weights. In a differential weight averaging model, in 
contrast to a constant weight model, each level of a piece of information may 
have a different weight. Thus, examining the extent of the empirical validity of 
the normative non-additivity rule would seem to be an interesting and complex 
80 Implicit psychological theories in legal thought 
field of research. 
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